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Abstract
In this paper, we put forward a definition of over-adaptation in disaster risk reduction
(DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) projects. We detail an illustrative case in
which the response to extreme weather risk while aligned with the goals of CCA, is
implemented beyond the economically efficient scale. We undertake a cost-benefit anal-
ysis of the 2013 Finnish Electricity Market Act, enacted partially as a reaction to long,
storm-induced electricity blackouts experienced after 2000. The Act imposes strict re-
quirements on electricity distribution companies as regards the duration of blackouts.
Meeting these requirements entails investments amounting to billions of euros. As a
benefit, we quantify the avoided cost from the blackouts for households and producers.
Our results, derived from Monte-Carlo simulations, show that for urban areas, the net
expected value is positive. However, in rural areas less strict requirements could have been
economically more efficient. Our results indicate that distributional impacts and corre-
spondence between those who benefit and those who pay the costs should be taken into
account in DRR and CCA policies that require large-scale investments. We also note that
the population affected by a disaster may not accept DRR and CCA that are successful in
terms of regulation and implementation. This applies when societal and individual pref-
erences do not coincide.
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Introduction
Economic Analysis of Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation
Measures
Various measures have been implemented or proposed to reduce the impacts of extreme
weather events on, and the increasing threat of climate change to, communities, the economy
and societies, (e.g. Hallegatte 2009; Konrad and Thum 2014). The goal of such measures is to
reduce the exposure and vulnerability of people and assets to natural hazards and climate
change and thereby to mitigate their impacts (IPCC 2012). Both climate change adaptation
(CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) are cross-cutting policy fields, implying that the
respective goals are seldom the only goals of a given sectorial policy or measure. For example,
in the public sector, DRR and CCA goals are pursued by first integrating relevant DRR and
CCA policy instruments into sectorial policies and then ensuring that the sectorial policy goals
are harmonised with the goals of DRR and CCA. (COM 2013; Rivera et al. 2015; Pilli-Sihvola
and Väätäinen-Chimpuku 2016).
From an economic perspective, there are several criteria for assessing DRR and CCA policy
instruments. The Potential Pareto Improvement (PPI) criterion states that the aggregate level of
benefits should exceed the costs (e.g. Freeman et al. 2014). A stricter criterion of Pareto
optimality requires optimality in the sense that the aggregate benefits of the policy instrument
are maximised by equating the marginal benefits to the marginal costs (e.g. Mendelsohn 2012).
Whether these criteria are met can be determined by using cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA
and cost-effectiveness analysis are traditional tools for determining the economic efficiency of
public sector policies and projects (Boardman et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2017) and they have also
been used extensively for analysing DRR and CCA measures (Shreve and Kelman 2014).
The aim of this paper is to analyse whether over-investment in DRR and CCA occurs, and
how the public reacts to major infrastructure investments whose costs they must eventually
bear. In the process, we clarify issues related to applying CBA in CCA- and DRR-related
investments. We undertake an in medias res social CBA on the amended Finnish Electricity
Market Act, passed in 2013 (588/2013). Among its other goals, the Act seeks to decrease the
susceptibility of the electricity network to extreme weather and to make distribution companies
adapt to changing weather patterns. This has required major investments in resilient electricity
distribution networks. The measures required by the Act sparked an intense public debate, as
they were followed by substantial increases in the distribution rates (in Finland, production and
distribution are separated), and raised the question of whether the policy was an overreaction
from an economic point of view. As a sizable investment in DRR and CCAwith quantifiable
benefits, costs and uncertainty, the project serves as a good case for using a CBA to evaluate
DRR and CCA measures from an economic perspective.
Based on the analysis in Shreve and Kelman (2014), a considerable majority of the cost-
benefit analyses in the literature have concluded that investing in DRR and CCA measures is
beneficial; that is, benefits exceed costs. However, this evidence alone does not warrant the
conclusion that DRR and CCA investments are economically efficient and advisable. Indeed, the
analysis in Shreve and Kelman (2014) indicates that ex-ante CBAs showing that benefits do not
exceed costs are not reported in the literature: no investment was made and no study published.
In other words, the CBAs reported suffer from publication bias in that only highly positive or
highly negative results have been published (on publication bias, see Easterbrook et al. 1991;
Møller and Jennions 2001; in the CBA literature, see Bell et al. 2006) and the hazards studied
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have been based on the ease of calculating the benefits (Shreve and Kelman 2014). The CCA
options reported have been almost exclusively favourable ones, although occasional reports of
maladaptation have appeared (Noble et al. 2014).
In section BBackground to the Case Study ,^ we present the political background of the case
study. Second section goes on to provide an economic definition of the case where marginal
costs exceed marginal benefits and defines this as over-adaptation. In third section we discuss
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a method and the data for our case study. Fourth section
describes the results and gives a short account of the public reaction to the Act and the public
sector’s response to this. In fifth section, we consider the limitations of the analysis and
prospects for future research. Sixth section concludes with a discussion of the policy implica-
tions of the study.
Background to the Case Study
Finland is a highly developed northern European country where long-term policy and cultural
development have averted disasters triggered by natural hazards, (see e.g. Pilli-Sihvola et al.
2017). The Finnish approach to security could be said to exhibit highly risk-aversive prefer-
ences (Saastamoinen and Kuosmanen 2016); indeed, they approach lexicographic preferences,
with the security of the country and its citizens being the most preferred asset regardless of
economic considerations. The major risks are extra-tropical cyclones, winter storms and major
snow loads, which cause trees to fall on power lines, resulting in long blackouts. Accordingly,
one of the goals of the revised 2013 Electricity Market Act was to reduce the impacts of
extreme weather on Finnish electricity consumers with due consideration of the altered
weather patterns that climate change will bring. Long blackouts such as those experienced
in summer 2010 prompted a need to boost investments in the electricity distribution network,
and imposing strict requirements on the permissible duration of the blackouts was considered
an effective way to do so (Government Proposal HE 20/2013). The policy process to revise the
legislation started quite a bit earlier, in 2001.
The first analyses on the need to reform the legislation were undertaken in 2001. These
studies (see Appendix for the list of background studies done prior to the 2013 Act) concluded
that the law had to be updated to meet the changing environmental and societal conditions and
that it had to include measurable targets. As drafting began, various limits on the length of
power outages were assessed. The technology was outdated, and major investments were
needed to upgrade it to meet the standards for modern electricity and telecommunication
infrastructure and societal structures. Moreover, changes in forest management had increased
the exposure of the distribution network to storm and snow damage, and this vulnerability had
to be reduced. Two storms in 2001, major thunderstorms in 2010 and heavy snow loads in
2011 (see Fig. 4) highlighted the need to overhaul the distribution network.
The requirements of the 2013 Electricity Market Act are an example of a policy instrument
that could substantially reduce the impacts of weather extremes and climate change, for the
investments it necessitates would eliminate most of the threat of trees damaging power lines.
The Act imposes strict requirements on the duration of blackouts: in rural areas (excluding
premises without permanent residents) they should not last no longer than 36 h, and in urban
areas no longer than 6 h. The transition period for meeting the requirements extends until
2029, with mid-term goals to be reached by 2019 and 2023 (Electricity Market Act 2013). The
upshot of these requirements is that electricity distribution companies have to improve the
reliability of their networks, mainly by replacing traditional overhead lines with underground
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ones (Partanen et al. 2012; Saastamoinen and Kuosmanen 2016). The preliminary assessments
undertaken prior to the Act indicate that underground cabling is the only way to ensure
compliance with the requirements of the Act where the low- and medium-voltage networks
are concerned (Partanen et al. 2012). High-voltage power lines in Finland are already weather
resilient, as buffer zones are cleared around them.
The three main goals of the 2013 Act (588/2013) are reliability of electricity supply,
affordable rates and reasonable service principles (s. 1). The Act contains explicit references
to the capability required of the electricity transmission and distribution systems if they are to
withstand normal, expected Finnish climate conditions. In this respect, the Act has integrated
DRR and CCA needs quite well, and research findings (Gregow et al. 2011) on the changing
risk to forests due to climate change were used when the Act was being drafted. The Act (s. 24)
also states that transmission rates and conditions need to be equal and non-discriminatory for all
consumers. However, the goal of affordable rates for commercial and residential users, justified
in terms of strategic goals for economic and social development, partly conflicts with the aims
of reliability and reasonable service principles. Compliance with the 2013 Act has required
considerable investment on the part of the network companies. The sharp increase in the price of
electricity distribution for consumers that followed its enactment led to a major public debate.
This and ensuing parliamentary debates, in turn, resulted in the revision of the Act in 2017. The
revised Act states that, in principle, price rises should be moderate but that extraordinary costs
can justify stronger price increases. The permissible durations for blackouts were not altered.
Despite the revision of the Act on 2017, on 28May 2018, theMinistry of Economic Affairs and
Employment, which drafted the Act, ordered an investigation into the price rises and their
spatial distribution due to sharp price increases witnessed after the coming into force of the Act.
The ministry commissioned several assessments of the Act during the period 2001–2013.
Some of these included economic analyses; for example, Partanen et al. (2006) concluded that
a fully underground cable network would be economically feasible only if the avoided cost
were 2.5 times higher than the amount estimated at the time of the analysis for a 40-year
investment schedule. If the investment had to be made in a shorter time period (for example,
prior to 2030, the end of the transition period allowed by the Act), the avoided cost would have
to be 5.5 times higher than the estimates at the time. Later, Partanen et al. (2012) concluded
that a time limit of 24 h for blackouts in rural areas, the limit considered initially, would not be
economically efficient, and that a 36-h time limit would be preferable. However, the report
only compared these two options and their economic feasibility. The legislative proposal
(Government Proposal HE 20/2013) included an analysis of the avoided-cost based disutility
for the consumers, but did not reach the level of detail of a thorough CBA.
Economic Definition of over-Adaptation to Climate Change
Climate change adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its
effects. The IPCC defines adaptation as follows: BIn human systems, adaptation seeks to
moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human
intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects^. (IPCC 2014). In
economic terms, adaptation seeks to reduce the costs related to climate change and, if possible,
to turn the negative impacts into positive ones (Tol 2005). CCA can take place at different
scales in economics: the economic agents are households, firms and the public sector. This
paper focuses on public CCA. Adaptation can also be further broken down into two types,
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anticipatory (planned) and reactive (IPCC 2012; Perrels et al. 2013). In the present case
adaptation is cast as anticipatory action resulting in protective investments. However, as
discussed in section 1.2, the 2013 Electricity Act (and its induced investments) and revision
in 2017 are steps in a learning process, one involving anticipation as well as reaction.
Investments and implementation of CCA measures can lead to three types of sub-optimal-
ity: 1) under-adaptation, which implies a lack of adequate CCA in the face of changing
climate (Hanemann 2000; Quentin Grafton 2010); 2) over-adaptation, which implies an over-
reaction to the problem (Hanemann 2000); and 3) maladaptation, which is any action that
increases vulnerability to climate change, increases the risk of negative outcomes or diminishes
welfare (Barnett and O’Neill 2010; IPCC 2014). Maladaptation has been widely discussed in
the literature, and some real-world examples have been presented (Noble et al. 2014). Under-
adaptation, or inadequate adaptation, has been identified as a potential threat: the actions taken
may not be enough to adapt (Quentin Grafton 2010) or, for instance, the private sector may not
have adequate incentives to implement CCA measures (Eisenack 2014). However, the litera-
ture on over-adaptation is virtually lacking: the only examples of over-adaptation that we were
able to find in the literature were the few in Shreve and Kelman (2014), where the benefit-cost
ratio of CCA investments was below 1. Despite the clear economic implications of over-
adaptation, no exact definition of it has been provided to date.
Many CCA decisions concern public policies, public goods or goods with characteristics of
such goods (non-rivalry and non-excludability); examples include early warning systems or
flood control systems. Optimal CCA for a public good, in terms of partial equilibrium, (e.g.
Mendelsohn 2012; OCED, 2018) is to maximise the social net benefits from the provision of
the (CCA) good:
max∑Bi Qð Þ−C Qð Þ; ð1Þ
where Bi is the net present value of the stream of expected value from the public CCA effort
such that Bi = ∫ EV(bi, t)e−rt, bi, t the benefit for individual i at time t, and Q the quantity of the
public good. By differentiating with respect to Q, we get the first order condition for the
optimal CCA decision, where M refers to marginal changes:
∑MBi Qð Þ ¼ MC Qð Þ ð2Þ
Thus, at the optimum, the aggregated marginal benefits should match the marginal cost of
provision of the public good. Several remarks are in order regarding the optimality conditions.
First, in theory, the differences in the social marginal utility of money should be accounted in
the aggregation process, a procedure known as distributional weighting. (e.g. Boadway 2006;
Johansson-Stenman 2005; Adler 2016; Nurmi and Ahtiainen 2018). Secondly, the quantity of
public CCA policy, or Q, is an abstract measure reflecting the scale of the proposed action. In
our case study, for example, the quantity of public policy refers to the extent to which the
electric grid needs to be renewed in response to the requirements of the Act. A less strict Act
would require a lower renewal rate, which could be interpreted as a lower quantity of CCA in
this example. In this sense, the quantity itself can be seen as a function of the requirements of
the regulation, such that Q =Q(L), in which the vector L represents different characteristics of
the regulation. In the present case, these characteristics refer to requirements stipulating the
allowable length of power outages in urban and rural areas, as well as to the required uptake
schedule. Each of these characteristics can be seen as one dimension of the vector L, which
determines the quantity of the public policy.
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The situation we have chosen to analyse is thus far from being a discrete-choice case, in
which the only decision would be whether to implement the Act or not. This is true of nearly
all public good decisions, such as deciding on the size of a dam (Hallegatte et al. 2012), the
scale of proposed green infrastructure to prevent urban storm-water issues (Nurmi et al. 2016;
Nordman et al. 2018) or the extent of early warning systems (Holland 2008).
We define over-adaptation as a situation in which a CCA policy instrument and its
implementation increase the resilience of individuals and society but lead to a level of
adaptation that is not economically efficient. This problem can be defined using a simple
formula. Assuming diminishing marginal utility of benefits such that an increase in the
quantity of the public good increases the benefits but at a diminishing rate, the formula can
be written as follows:
∑iMBi Q Lð Þð Þ < MC: ð3Þ
If the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits at some point of provision, less of the public
good should be provided; that is, its quantity should be reduced to a level where the marginal
benefit equals the marginal costs. However, even at this level of provision, the total benefit of
the project can surpass the costs, resulting in a positive benefit-cost ratio or a positive net
present value (NPV). This happens if the marginal benefits at lower levels of provision are
high enough to compensate for the negative net benefits at higher levels. This situation is
depicted in Fig. 1. By contrast, under-adaptation refers to a situation in which the adaptation
policy or measure is implemented at a lower-than-optimal level. This is also depicted in Fig. 1.
Q1 : Max BCR Q1
  ¼ B
1
C1
> 0;NPV Q1
  ¼ B1−C1 > 0;MB > MC→underadaptation ð4Þ
Q* : BCR Q*
  ¼ B
*
C*
> 0;Max NPV Q*
  ¼ B*−C* > 0;MB ¼ MC→optimal adaptation ð5Þ
Q2 : BCR Q2
  ¼ B
2
C2
> 0;NPV Q2
  ¼ B2−C2 > 0;MB < MC→overadaptation ð6Þ
The optimal level of adaptation was derived from equation (2), which states that at the
optimum the expected net present value (NPV) is maximised when marginal benefits and
costs are at equal level, as in Figure 1 at level Q∗ and in equation (5).
Another commonly used indicator of the efficiency of a policy or measure is the benefit-
cost ratio (BCR). For example, Kelman and Shreve (2014) only report the BCRs of DRR and
CCA measures, omitting studies that do not report the value. The BCR is a ratio of the net
present value of benefits to costs, as shown in equations (4)–(6). As Figure 1 and equation (4)
indicate, the ratio is typically highest at a low level of provision (e.g. at Q <Q∗). A low level of
provision could correspond to the first systematic efforts to cope with climate change and to
elementary disaster risk reduction programmes in developing countries. In Shreve and Kelman
(2014), extremely high BCRs are reported for drought reduction measures in the Sudan and
flood protection measures in India and the Philippines. Similar results are presented in Onuma
et al. (2017a, 2017b), a study showing that experience of a disaster reduces the impact of future
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disasters more in in lower-income than in higher-income countries. However, the optimality of
an adaptation policy or measure cannot be evaluated based on the BCR: in Figure 1 the BCR is
maximised at Q1,which corresponds to underadaptation.
We claim that the lack of evidence of overadaptation in the literature is partly due to the
misuse of the BCR as a measure of the efficiency of adaptation instead of the NPV, a more
appropriate indicator. The latter should be used where a sufficient number of different
provision levels of Q are compared with each other.
CBA practitioners are well aware that NPV is the correct measure when ranking different
policy options (e.g. Schwab and Lusztig 1969; Boardman et al. 2006; OECD 2018). If all
different provision levels could be evaluated, the option with the highest NPV would represent
with the optimal level of provision. In Figure 1 this corresponds to Q∗. By contrast, the
highest BCR would be found at low provision levels and if used as a decision guideline would
result in underprovision of the public good. Some caution should also be exercised when
interpreting NPVs: if only one or several provision levels are evaluated, a positive NPV in
itself only indicates a scale at which total benefits exceed costs. This can occur at levels of the
public adaptation good, reflecting either underadaptation or overadaptation, as seen in Figure 1
and in equations (4)–(6). In such a, case, the interpretation of the NPV and BCR coincide, as
pointed out by Shreve and Kelman (2014). Sometimes, even in the economics literature, a
positive NPV is interpreted as indicating an efficient adaptation effort. (e.g. Mendelsohn 2012),
but as explained above, this is not entirely correct. A thorough analysis should include several
different provision levels, preferably spanning a wide range of provision. For example,
Hallegatte et al. (2012) include three different levels of flood protection in their analysis: i)
one medium-sized dam, ii) two smaller dams and iii) one small dam. Provided that the
uncertainty in the analysis can be quantified, the option with the highest NPV should be
chosen. In addition, when analysing different provision levels, a marginal analysis should be
Total 
Beneﬁts
Total 
Costs
In €
Quanty
overadaptaon
underadaptaon
Fig. 1 Optimal adaptation, underadaptation and overadaptation
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conducted at the recommended level of provision to determine whether the net benefits could
be further increased by either reducing or increasing the provision level of the focal CCA
policy or measure.
Finally, uncertainty is an inherent feature of CCA, so much so that the uncertainty related to
climate change adaptation decisions has been termed Bdeep uncertainty .^ This can refer to any
of three factors: 1) no clear consensus on which models should be used to assess the future, 2)
an unknown probability distribution of key parameters and 3) an uncertain value of outcomes
(Hallegatte et al. 2012). In such cases, it has been suggested that instead of calculating the
expected NPV of investment decisions as a basis for decision-making, robust adaptation
strategies should be adopted (Dessai and Hulme 2007; Hallegatte 2009; Hallegatte et al.
2012). These include (Hallegatte 2009) no-regret measures, which create benefits even in
the absence of climate change; reversible measures, which are easily retrofitted if climate
projections prove incorrect; safety margin measures, which reduce the vulnerability of a
system at low or no cost; soft measures, which entail institutional or financial changes; reduced
time horizon measures, which involve reducing the lifetime of an investment; and strategies
that have synergies with mitigation. Based on the robust adaptation theory, a CBA analysing a
CCA policy or measure should include at least a qualitative discussion of the robustness of the
proposed actions.
Cost Benefit Analysis for the 2013 Electricity Market Act
Methodological Issues
We apply CBA to the reliability requirements of the 2013 Electricity Market Act. We assume
cost minimisation for the maximum allowable blackout calculated for a given number of
distribution companies in their market areas. As a cost, we include the infrastructure invest-
ment in underground cabling required to comply with the Act, calculated based on previous
assessments (most notably Partanen et al. 2012). As a benefit, we include the avoided costs of
blackouts estimated from blackout data and Willingness-to-Pay surveys and Value-of-Lost-
Load (VoLL) calculations for industrial users. The Finnish electricity network for low- and
medium-voltage lines has been divided into regional monopolies. This being the case, all the
costs will eventually be transferred to the customers as an increased rate for electricity
distribution, and they will receive the benefits of the Act. The Act will benefit electricity
market companies by decreasing their uncertainty relating to compensation costs from black-
outs, costs that in the worst case might amount to 30% of their turnover. (Partanen et al. 2012;
Saastamoinen and Kuosmanen 2016). To avoid double counting, we will not consider the
decrease in compensation costs as a benefit.
We compare two different levels of provision, urban and rural, as differentiated in the law,
and discuss the benefits and costs at the margin. Our results indicate that the Act results in a
non-optimal level of provision of public adaptation, a case as yet unreported in the literature.
Smith et al. (2017) point to various factors hindering the use of CBA in many DRR- and
CCA-related investments: imperfect valuation methods, sensitivity to assumptions regarding
intergenerational preferences (e.g. discount rate), tendency to favour monetised (often tangible
market) costs and benefits and inconsistent and often inadequate treatment of non-quantifiable
(often intangible non-market) costs and benefits (Atkinson et al. 2008; Boardman et al. 2006;
Bonzanigo and Kalra 2014; Florio 2014). In addition, CBA is distributionally insensitive
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(Adler 2013, in DRR CBA see Hallegatte et al. 2016) and often fails to analyse the
distortionary effects of raising public funds, reflected primarily as impacts on the labour
supply. (Boadway 2006; Bos et al. 2018).
Other methods, partly to overcome the obstacles related to the use of CBA, have been used
and developed for assessing optimal investment levels of DRR and CCA measures (Smith
et al. 2017; Watkiss et al. 2014). Real-option analysis is used in situations where it may be
beneficial to wait before the cost-efficient investments are made, one instance being if the
investment would benefit from more accurate information. Portfolio analysis is a tool to
determine the efficient frontier of investment options, a point where the NPVof the combina-
tion of different options cannot be increased without increasing uncertainty at the same time.
Portfolio analysis draws on modern portfolio theory, which is based on the idea of maximising
profit and hedging risk by spreading the investment optimally over various assets. Portfolio
theory can be used for CCA when a number of measures exist to reduce the risk of climate
change and there is uncertainty about the benefits of individual measures. Robust decision
making is a decision support method used under deep uncertainty, the purpose being to find
CCA measures which will function well under various future scenarios (Lempert and Groves
2010; Lempert et al. 2013; Lempert 2014; Watkiss et al. 2014).
In our case, the reported limitations of CBA are not a major concern. First, the investment
period of the infrastructure resulting from the renewed policy is estimated at between 50 and
70 years (Partanen 2015). This timeframe involves intergenerational issues over two or three
generations; however, the cost of the capital investment will be paid by the customers and,
contrary to what Weitzman (2001) suggests, time-declining interest rates should not be applied.
Secondly, our case does not involve any major intangible ecosystem or health costs or benefits,
but we have taken into account the value of bare forest land that is freed up as the electricity
grid is moved from forest to roadsides. All in all, costs and benefits are relatively easy to
estimate, as will be shown in the analysis in a later section.
Thirdly, distributional effects are taken into account in our CBA in two ways. In the first,
the average willingness to pay (WTP) is applied for all individuals in the affected population
rather than using a higher value for wealthier persons. This is the approach recommended by
the European Environmental Agency in health economic studies (EEA 2009) and its theoret-
ical aspects are discussed in Adler (2013). However, in our discussion, we take into account
what this implies for the results between different regions. In the second, the spatial distribu-
tion of benefits and costs has been taken into account in the policy implications, discussed in
section 5.
Fourthly, distortionary effects have been left out of the analysis, as there is no adequate
research regarding the labour supply effects of changing electricity prices. Most importantly,
no alternative methods to CBA, suggested in Watkiss et al. (2014) and Smith et al. (2017), are
needed in our analysis, as the Act is already in force and its implementation is under way.
There is no opportunity to wait (a requirement for real-option analysis) and no alternative CCA
measures can be used by the companies to meet the requirements of the Act (a requirement of
portfolio analysis).
Fifthly, uncertainty related to parameter values is quantifiable and the resulting distribution
of net benefits can be simulated with the Monte Carlo method. Monte Carlo simulation is a
widely used method for analysing the impacts of uncertainty in the parameter values on the
results of a CBA. If this uncertainty could be represented with contingent outcomes, one could
simply illustrate the results of CBA using different scenarios. However, in the present case we
have many uncertain parameter values, which precludes examining all the combinations of
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values. Our approach is to specify a distribution for each parameter value, take a set of random
draws from each distribution, and repeat the trial a number of times. We follow suggestions of
Boardman et al. (2006) when specifying the distributions. The resulting histogram can then be
used to arrive at statistics about the outcome, such as the expected values and range of NPV
and the significance of the results. (Boardman et al. 2006).
Finally, we should point out that our CBA considers implementation costs and directly
related avoided costs only. A structural and substantial improvement of the electricity distri-
bution network also has induced economic effects. For example, it may help to keep some
residents and economic activity in the service area. Furthermore, some of the avoided costs
represent actual expenditures rather than inconvenience costs, and these funds can be
reallocated for consumption, creating more welfare. Then again, if prices rise more than
consumers are willing to pay in a given area, this will create negative effects in the form of
reduced purchasing power and areas becoming less attractive places to live. We disregard these
spillover effects in the secondary markets in our CBA (Boardman et al. 2006) but discuss them
in section 5, as they may be relevant information for cross-cutting policy goals.
Analysis
Estimation of Benefits for Household Consumers
Various methods are used to monetise the increase in the utility from an improvement in the
quality or quantity of a good for individuals in society. Direct methods include contingent
valuation, indirect ones travel cost or hedonic pricing. The disutility of a blackout for consumers
is usually valuated using contingent valuation surveys, which elicit the willingness-to-pay
(WTP) to avoid a blackout or willingness-to-accept (WTA) compensation for one.
The most recent such survey in Finland was carried out in 2014 (Matschoss 2014). Rather
than the cost per unit of time, the survey asked respondents about their cost per value of lost
load (VoLL). In our view, lost load is a harder concept for household consumers to understand
than hours without electricity, but in the international literature VoLL is the standard method
for reporting the cost of blackouts. However, surveys designed around VoLL often use
questions related to inconvenience per time unit (London Economics 2013) and this can be
directly converted to cost per time unit. As the average consumer in Finland uses approxi-
mately one kilowatt hour of electricity per hour, the VoLL per kilowatt hour is essentially the
same as the cost of one hour without electricity.
Converted into hours of blackout, the average VoLL figures in Matschoss (2014) were
WTP 1.5€/h and WTA 15€/h. These were assumed to be linear over the duration of the
blackout. The high disparity between WTP and WTA suggests behavioural anomalies; the
income elasticity of WTP in the study was unrealistically high at 18. The tenfold differ-
ence between the WTP and WTA implies that a consumer would not accept 14 euros in
compensation for a one-hour blackout that he or she experienced, yet would not be willing
to pay two euros to avoid the same blackout. Given such behavioural anomalies (e.g.
Kahneman et al. 1991), these values are not directly applicable in a CBA. The responses to
the WTP surveys also suggest that consumers do not necessarily support the lexicographic
preferences adopted in national-level decision making (see section 4.4). Interestingly, the
high divergence between WTP and WTA in the surveys suggests that an ownership effect
obtains among consumers with regard to their right to undisrupted electricity consumption.
(London Economics 2013).
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London Economics (2013) gathered international estimates for the costs of blackouts to
households, and estimated VoLL figures in the UK. The range of WTP estimates in the literature
is very wide. The smallest WTP for a one-hour blackout was 0.4€/h (Carlsson and Martinsson
2008). Accent et al. (2008) obtained a value close to 30€/h. TheWTP values in London Economics
(2013), only about 1€/h. are significantly lower than those in Finland. The WTAvalues reported,
which ranged from 4 to 8€/h under different conditions, are closer to the Finnish estimates.
We apply two different methods to estimate the level of benefits that domestic consumers
and industry obtain from the Act. For domestic users, the benefits are evaluated based on the
duration of the avoided blackouts. The monetary benefits are estimated by combining the two
Finnish contingent valuation surveys (Silvast 2005; Matschoss 2014) and values reported in
the international literature (London Economics 2013). We drop the two lowest and two highest
outliers in determining the range of WTP values; this yields a lower bound of 1.5€/h
(Matschoss 2014) and an upper bound of 15€/h (Accent 2004), all converted into €2015.
The discrete time periods and amounts of lost energy consumption used in the literature
have been scaled into a continuous model using the results of Silvast et al. (2005), who drew
on a range of blackout durations to create a model very close to a continuous model. The study
also provides a detailed description of the Finnish context. According to Silvast et al. (2005),
the cost of the first second of a blackout for a household consumer is, on average, 1.7 euros in
winter and 1.8 in summer; for a 36-h blackout the values are 368.7 euros and 366.5 euros,
respectively. As the costs of blackouts between these two extremes were almost linearly
distributed, we fitted a simple linear model (Table 1):
Estimation of Benefits for Industrial Users
We estimate the benefits for industrial users using the production function approach. VoLL is
the appropriate measure as it allows scaling for the volume of production, reflecting the fact
that the cost of a blackout of a particular duration is not the same for industrial users of
different sizes. Table 2 below presents estimates of the loss of value-added production for
different industries based on national statistics and recently updated by the Finnish Energy
Authority (2015) using values reported in Mäkinen et al. (2009). In the table, VoLL €/kW is
the value of production lost due to a disruption (of any duration) in the supply of electricity and
€/kWh the value of production lost based on the entire duration of the blackout.
Statistics Finland (2014a) gathers statistics about the use of energy in different sectors.
Within the sectors, companies are classified based on their turnover. For example, in the
agricultural sector, 99% of the companies are small, having turnovers of less than €100,000.
The average energy consumption for such a company is 20,000 kWh per year, or 2.3kWh/h,
and the average power is 25 kW. The power and electricity use have also been calculated for
the chemical, paper, metal and mining sectors. Only companies with a turnover less than
€400,000 have been included in the above figures. Large facilities, whose turnover and
consumption are greater, obtain their electricity directly from the high-voltage grid, which is
a weather resilient.
Table 1 Output of the linear re-
gression model Estimate Std. Error t-value
Intercept 9.8702 5.3269 1.853
Length in hours 10.1395 0.3138 32.314
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Estimation of Benefits from Reclaiming Bare Forest Land
Underground cabling brings ecosystem benefits. For instance, one company in our data set
estimates that in 2016, 800 ha of what had been mainly forested land became made available
when overhead lines were removed, and estimates that in the future the figure will be 1000 ha
annually (Caruna 31.10.2017). This would correspond to approximately 2000 ha/year in our
study area. To quantify these benefits, we use the figures from Tahvonen et al. (2013), who
calculated the value of cleared forest land assuming optimal rotation periods. For an optimal
land type in the study area, the value at a discount rate of 3% corresponds to 447€ per hectare;
when the rate approaches 5%, the value per hectare approaches zero. For a less optimal land
type, the corresponding values are very low, 38€ and − 177€. We assume that in the case of
negative values, the land will not be used for forestry; a minimum value of 0 and a maximum
value of €447 per hectare is used in the Monte Carlo simulation. These values are already
discounted for future profits. The benefits will be realised during the renewal phase of the
network, a period spanning 15 years.
The length of power lines will increase due to their relocation from forest to roadsides. It
has been estimated that in rural areas the increase in length will be 1.1 times for the low-
voltage network and 1.2 times for the medium-voltage network. (personal communication,
Karvonen 2018). In the Monte-Carlo simulation, we specify a distribution with a range
between 1.0 and 1.2 for the low-voltage network and between 1.1 and 1.3 for the medium-
voltage network.
Estimation of Costs
As noted above, compliance with the requirements of the Act requires a high level of
investment in the case of both the low- and medium-voltage networks (Partanen et al.
2012). In particular, a significant proportion of the electricity network laid underground. To
quantify the costs, we need to know the i) current extent of underground cabling, ii) required
extent of underground cabling and iii) length of the network in rural and urban areas and iv)
costs of underground as opposed to overhead lines. Partanen et al. (2012) present estimates of
the required level of underground cabling in rural areas, where underground cabling of
medium- and low-voltage networks are partial substitutes for each other; that is, by increasing
the proportion of underground cabling in one network, the proportion can be decreased in the
other, but at a diminishing rate.
Figure 2 illustrates the requirements for underground cabling rates in rural areas for the
electricity distribution companies included in the analysis of Partanen et al. (2012). The set of
companies is not the same as that in our analysis, but the same cabling rates are assumed to
apply. Each coloured line represents the required rate for one company, and the dots describe
the current extent of underground cabling. For instance, if the cabling rate for the low-voltage
Table 2 VoLL for Finnish indus-
trial users (Energy Authority 2015)
and agriculture (Honkapuro 2006)
Sector VoLL €/kW VoLL €/kWh (€2015)
Mining 0.44 0.27
Paper and wood 2.60 0.23
Chemical industry 2.40 2.00
Metal industry 2.02 0.98
Agriculture 0.45 9.38
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network is 35–45%, the rate for the medium voltage network must extend to 50–80%; if the
cabling rate of the low-voltage network is 70–90%, the rate of the medium-voltage network
needs to be between 20 and 60%, depending on the company. These rates would make it
possible to meet the 36-h blackout limit. In urban areas, a 100% underground cabling rate is
required for both the low- and medium-voltage networks to ensure compliance with the 6-h
limit.
In our analysis, we assume that the companies choose the level of cabling that i) meets the
requirements and ii) is the cheapest to produce. In other words, they comply with the Act but in
a cost-efficient manner.
Data
To evaluate the increased reliability of the electricity grid, we need data on the current and
expected blackouts in the analysed region. In Finland, electricity distribution companies are
required to collect blackout statistics. The annual statistics are published by the Finnish
Energy, an umbrella organisation of the energy companies in Finland, but the data are available
only as an aggregate for all 80 companies operating in the country. To overcome this obstacle,
we purchased raw data for eight companies from a private consultancy firm that analyses data
for Finnish Energy (ENEASE 2016). This data set is also aggregated such that no individual
company can be identified. However, we know the companies in the set and are able to analyse
their network status. In addition to blackout data, we need the rate of underground cabling and
customer information, which are provided by the Energy Authority (2015). Significantly, the
operating areas of the companies form a single, representative region for which we can also
analyse the weather and climatic conditions now and in the future.
The region encompasses Pirkanmaa region in south-western Finland as well as surrounding
areas served by the electricity distribution companies operating in Pirkanmaa. The sample
covers over 30% of the consumers in Finland, has both rural and urban areas in approximately
the same proportion as the rest of Finland, and contains both large and small companies. Some
of the companies are very small and local. Table 3 shows the distribution of consumers
between different industries and household consumers among the eight companies.
For the costs, we need to know i) the present rate of underground cabling, ii) the length of
both the low- and medium-voltage networks for all the operators, divided between urban and
rural users, and iii) the costs of underground cabling for a unit of (km) of network.
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The current level of cabling is public knowledge, provided in the annual reports of
electricity companies. (Energy Authority 2015). These are shown for the eight companies in
the area in Figure 3. The y-axis marks the current rate of medium-voltage underground
cabling, and the x-axis that of low-voltage underground cabling.
In the areas studied, the total length of the medium voltage network is 52,528 km, and of
the low-voltage network 99,708 km. (Energy Authority 2015).
Lastly, we need to know the average costs for both the low- and medium-voltage networks.
Partanen et al. (2012) estimate for the medium-voltage network that underground cabling is
two times more expensive than traditional overhead power lines, the costs being 61,700€/km
compared to 28,800–32,200€/km. Based on the data from the Energy Authority (2011, 2014,
2016), a substantial decrease in the costs has occurred only in the case of the heaviest cables;
the costs of other types and the average costs have remained almost constant. No substantial
learning effects and resulting decrease in costs are expected, as thousands of kilometres of
underground cables have already been installed.
For the low-voltage network, the difference in the costs between underground cabling and
overhead lines in rural areas is smaller, approximately 3000€/km, the figures being 21,000
€/km and 18,000 €/km respectively. Data collected from the electricity grid companies indicate
that in urban areas the costs are again nearly twice as high for underground cabling, or 34,000
€/km compared to 18,000€/km (Energy Authority 2016). The difference is explained by the
more expensive digging costs in urban areas.
Table 3 Users of the electricity grids in the study area
Division of different
user groups
Agriculture Industry Services and
construction
Households Total
Share % 0.6 0.6 0.6 98.2 100
Amount 6600 6600 6600 080200 100,000
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The blackout data cover the 10-year period from 2005 to 2014, which includes the years
2011 and 2013 that saw storms causing long blackouts in the study area. The return period for
such storms cannot be estimated with current knowledge, as gust winds cause most of the
major damage to trees - and most blackouts – but the measurement period for such winds has
not been not long enough to produce return period estimates for a particular location.
Significantly, both the 2011 and 2013 storms occurred when the soil had yet to freeze.
When the depth of soil frost extends less than 20 cm, trees are not properly anchored to the
ground and are thus very susceptible to uprooting (Gregow et al. 2011). As we are interested in
the benefits of improving the reliability of the electricity grid in the future (time span 0–
60 years), we have to consider the effects of climate change on weather phenomena, soil
conditions and vulnerability of the sites affected.
First, we consider the current climatic conditions in the area of concern, that is, Pirkanmaa
and surrounding areas, meaning southern, southwestern and central Finland. The current
blackout risk can be calculated based on the 2005–2014 time series, which represents the
degree of variability in the Finnish climate and the distribution of blackouts between years well
(Figure 2). For the future climate, we first take a single-parameter approach. For extreme
winds, the model estimates from the EU FP7 project Rain (Groenemeijer et al. 2016) show that
extreme winds with an annual exceedance probability of 2% in 1971–2000 will have a
probability of 2.5% in 2021–2050 over southern and southwestern Finland. For 2021–2050,
there is not much difference between different climate scenarios. From 2071 onwards, climate
scenarios have a much greater impact on the annual high wind gust probabilities, but this falls
largely out of the scope of our time frame. Annual blizzard probability is decreasing in
southern Finland according to all climate scenarios. We can conclude that changes in gust
wind or blizzards will not in themselves increase the risk of blackouts. An additional risk to the
electricity grid to consider, however, is crown snow load, which is projected to increase in
major parts of the country under all climate scenarios and time periods. However, the model
results are not statistically significant at the 95% level except for the high-emission scenario
RCP8.5 in 2071–2100 in southern Finland, where the results indicate a decreasing risk.
(Groenemeijer et al. 2016).
Secondly, we assess the risk induced by climate change and its impact on soil frost (Gregow
et al. 2011). These results suggest an increase in the risk of trees being uprooted, even if
changes in the wind speeds do not occur. Gregow et al. (2011) indicates that the number of
days when tree anchorage is poor will increase will from around 95 (1971–2000) to 185 days
(2040–2065) in southern Finland; in other words, the risk of uprooting will nearly double. In
central Finland, the corresponding numbers range from 90 to 125 days, implying a 40%
increase in risk. However, we remain cautious in using these estimates, the increased risk has
already been, to some extent, realised in our data due to the major storms in autumn and winter
2011 and 2013, which occurred with little or no soil frost.
Thus, we combine the increasing soil frost risk with the concurrent occurrence of strong
winds and snow loads to describe the storm impact risk. As presented in Gregow et al.
(2011 pp.48, Table 6), the risk of uprooting in the spruce-dominated areas in southern Finland
will increase by 18% by 2046–2065 when using a SREX climate scenario A1B (Nakicenovic
et al. 2000). This corresponds to RCP6.5 or RCP8.5 (Rogelj et al. 2012), depending on the
period in question. In Jyväskylä, which reflects the conditions in central Finland, the projected
increase is 13%. While these estimates do not include changes in tree species or forest
management by 2050, they do give an indication of the economic risk lying ahead in the
spruce-dominated regions of southern and central Finland.
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In our analysis, we combine this information with the current risk of weather-induced
blackouts. The low-end estimate of the future blackout estimate is based on the low-emission
scenario, in which the conditions that led to blackouts in 2005–2014 do not change. In the
medium- to high-end estimate, we use the risk level indicated by the high-emission scenarios,
leading to a 13% to 18% increase in risk by2045. We assume a linear increase in the risk and
extrapolate the increase for the remaining period 2045–2075. This leads to an asymmetric
distribution for the annual increase in the risk ranging from 0 to 0.6%.
Results
In a cost-benefit analysis, the timing of both the benefits and costs needs to be analysed and
discounted to present value. This requires numerical parameter values, which we have
obtained from various sources to analyse the costs and benefits as well as the uncertainties,
in particular those affecting the benefits. Additional parameters affecting the uncertainty
regarding future benefits are the rates of urban and rural population growth. Most underground
cabling will be done in rural areas, but with Finland still undergoing rapid urbanisation this
might affect the future benefits of the investment.
Benefits
The average annual number of weather-related blackouts was 34,360 in the study area,
affecting on average 107 customers. As an aggregate, the consumers faced approximately
3,642,000 blackouts annually. The average length of a blackout was 3 h 20 min. Figure 4
shows the yearly number of blackouts.
We calculate the benefits by assuming that the requirements of the Act are achieved, thus
assuming that the electricity network is upgraded according to the requirements of the Act. We
divide the household users into urban and rural users (Statistics Finland 2016). In urban areas,
we assume that no weather-related blackouts will occur as the underground cabling rate will be
increased to 100%. This results in annual benefits of 4.7–49 million € (with mean 19.9 million
€). In rural areas, we assume that the blackout frequency will be halved (as about 50% more of
Fig. 4 Weather related blackouts in the study area in 2005–2014
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the network will be laid underground) and that no blackouts longer than 36 h will occur. This
results in annual benefits of 6.8–70.9 million €. The wide range in both cases is due to the high
disparity between the WTP figures reported in the literature. However, the triangular distribu-
tion fitted to the range of WTP figures has more probability mass for the values closer to the
mean. The benefits are reported in 2015 euros.
For commercial users, we use the VoLL values shown in Table 2. Complementing these, we
have collected data on a typical company in each sector and its power and annual electricity
use (Statistics Finland 2017). As there are no data on the exact proportions of urban and rural
industries, we use the more conservative assumption that the frequency of the blackouts will be
halved. The projected benefits for each sector are shown in Table 4. Each sector included
contains different subsectors, such as the food industry, wood industry and support services for
mining, but as yet there is no VoLL available for sub-sectors separately.
Based on our analysis, the commercial benefits account for some 5% of the total benefits. In
the international literature, the total damage costs to industry from blackouts is estimated at
around 10% (LaCommare and Joseph 2004). The difference stems from our case as we have
taken into account only the small and medium sized industries. In Finland, large companies
and industrial facilities are connected to the high voltage network and are outside the scope of
this analysis.
Costs
In urban areas, the rate of underground cabling for both the low- and medium- voltage
networks must be 100% to meet the requirements of the Act. The current rate for the low-
voltage network is around 70%, and for the medium-voltage network 50–60%. (Energy
Authority 2015; Finnish Energy 2014). The investment cost for the former is 190–218 million
€ and for the latter 160–182 million €. For both networks, we further assume that 50% would
have to be renewed in any case as part of scheduled maintenance, and 50% would have to be
laid underground prematurely. (Partanen et al. 2012).
The underground cabling rates for low- and medium-voltage power lines are partial
substitutes in rural areas: increasing the rate in one network could lead to a decrease in the
rate required in the other. Underground cabling of the low-voltage network is much cheaper,
whereby the most cost-efficient approach is to increase the proportion of underground cabling
until it no longer compensates the lower rate in the medium-voltage network. This rate
(Partanen et al. 2012; Figure 1) is around 80%. Thus, we assume that in rural areas the
underground cabling rate of the low-voltage network will be 80%. The required rate for the
Table 4 Benefits for commercial users
Chemical
industry
Wood
and Paper
industry
Metal
industry
Mining Agriculture
Number of firms 600 300 1500 150 5450
Number of blackouts / year / firm 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Length of blackouts / blackout (hours) 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37 3.37
Annual damage / firm (2015€) 2090 1770 1560 350 110
Annual damage, sector (1000 2015€) 1260 530 2300 50 600
Annual benefit, sector (1000 2015€) 630 270 1150 25 300
Uncertainty range (1000 2015€) 410–840 180–360 770–1560 17–34 200–400
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medium-voltage network becomes 20–50% (Partanen et al. 2012; Figure 1), leaving a high
uncertainty range. An additional consideration is that the length of the electricity network is
assumed to increase, as noted earlier (personal communication, Karvonen 2018). Ultimately,
the total cost of meeting the requirements of the Act in rural areas will be 570–1460 million €.
The wide range is due to the uncertainty in the required underground cabling rate, which
depends on other measures to improve the network. A second source of uncertainty is the
increase in the length of the low-voltage and medium-voltage networks when cables are
removed from forested land and relocated to roadsides.
Parameter Values
Consumers of electricity obtain the benefits as soon as the investments have occurred and
receive the benefits as long as the underground cables are used. For the distribution companies
the investment costs are incurred immediately, but for consumers the cost is carried in keeping
with the write-off schedule (typically a 30-year straight line-depreciation) and the capital cost
of the investment. Consequently, the consumer benefits must exceed at least the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC). In 2014, the WACC for electricity networks was 3.2–4.5%.
(Äijälä et al. 2014; Ernst and Young 2014) but the cost of external financing has since
decreased by 0.5–1% (Bloomberg 2016). For the low end of the discount rate, we use 3%.
For the expected value, we use the average 12-month Euribor rate (since the euro area was
established and Finland joined it in 2002) plus the current rate; for the high end, we use the
highest Euribor rate plus the current cost of borrowed capital. It should be noted that
economists (Weitzman 2001) recommend using a time-declining discount rate; in the present
case, however, the benefits should be discounted by the cost of capital, as this will also be
borne directly by the consumers. In estimating rural and urban population trends, we use
projections calculated by the United Nations for Finland. WTP values were derived in section
3.2.1. The costs depend on the required underground cabling rates, as explained in section
3.2.3. Table 5 shows the ranges for the parameter values and their source.
Monte Carlo Analysis and Net Present Value
We ran a Monte-Carlo simulation with the above parameter values and distributions using the
Palisade @Risk for Risk Analysis (2018) add-in to Microsoft Excel statistical software. The
simulation was run 1,000,000 times. The NPV of the benefits was estimated separately for
improvements in the urban and rural networks. Figure 5 depicts the resulting distribution for
urban areas. NPV is positive at the 95% significance level. The mean of the NPV distribution
is 158 million euros. Of the variance in the NPV, the discount factor explains 86.1%; costs,
1%; WTP, 12.5%; and the urban growth rate, 0.4%.
Figure 6 shows the corresponding distribution for rural areas. The mean NPV is −374
million euros. There is a 96.2% probability that the NPV is negative in rural areas. In a
noteworthy difference compared to urban areas, in rural areas the uncertainty in the costs of
improving the network has a much larger effect on the variance of the NPV. This uncertainty
explains 73.8% of the variance, while the discount factor explains only 21.6%. Other factors
explaining the variance include the uncertainty in the true value of WTP (4.3%) and the
decrease in the rural population (0.3%).
To summarise, the expected NPV in urban areas is 158 million €, and in rural areas −374
million €. The expected benefits for industrial and agricultural users are 110 million €. To
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avoid double-counting, as the costs are already taken into account in the urban and rural
analysis, the 110 million euros are added to the aggregate NPV, resulting in total expected
NPVof −106 million euros.
The division of NPV between urban and rural areas only refers to the spatial component of
the benefits and costs, not to the relative proportion of the investment costs ultimately borne by
urban and rural consumers. In fact, if the electricity price increase is spatially uniform, urban
customers (85% of the population) will bear most of the total cost (85% assuming uniform
electricity use and prices), while the majority of the benefits will go to the rural areas
(expectation 40% vs. 60%). However, if an electricity company operates only in a rural area,
rural customers will pay all the costs, most likely resulting in greater rate increases than the
customers are willing to pay. Clearly, at the margin, in rural areas the costs are higher than the
benefits.
Fig. 6 The distribution of NPV for urban areas
Fig. 5 The distribution of NPV for the urban areas
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To further analyse the spatial distribution of the benefits and costs, we can divide electricity
grid companies into three different categories, examples of which exist can be found in our
data: 1) those operating only in rural areas, 2) those operating in both rural and urban areas and
3) those operating only in urban areas. The distribution of benefits and costs differs between
these types. All three company types can be found at national level: of the 80 electricity
distribution companies in Finland, the 15 largest supply electricity to 70% of the population.
Two of the three largest suppliers have rural as well as urban customers. There are also
companies that operate only at the scale of a rural municipality. (Finnish Energy 2017).
For companies in category 1, costs are expected to be higher than benefits for the
customers. In the case of those in category 2, customers in rural areas extract benefits from
the urban customers and may become beneficiaries depending on the distribution of rural and
urban customers. With companies in category 3, the NPV is positive at the 95% significance
level, and the customers benefit from the requirements of the Act.
In section 2, we introduced the concept of robust adaptation, described in terms of five
criteria (Hallegatte et al. 2009). Of these, the Act only fulfils the criterion of no-regret
measures, as it clearly creates benefits even in the absence of climate change. However, the
Act is not easily retro-fitted; it does not increase safety margins at a low cost; it cannot be
classified as a soft measure inasmuch as it results in major investment costs; and the time
horizon of the measure is long. Finally, synergies with climate change mitigation efforts are
unknown.
Public Reaction
The requirements in the 2013 Electricity Market Act led to major price increases in electricity
transmission and an ensuing public outcry over the situation. This following account of these
events is based on two sources: the official public releases of one of the distribution companies
most seriously affected by the public reaction, and the press releases of the office of the Finnish
Consumer Ombudsman. No media reports have been used. The situation can be understood
from the press release of 4 February 2016 by the company most heavily affected by the public
reaction: BCaruna regrets the distress caused to its customers after having to come to a solution
on price increases, due to the large-scale requirement for improvement. The company has
advised its customers regarding the network improvement measures required by the Electricity
Market Act (Electricity Market Act 588/2013), as well as the price increases connected with
them. The price increases have resulted in a large number of objections from citizens as well as
in considerable media attention^ (Caruna 4.2.2016). The situation began in early 2016, when
major price increases were announced by the company, the largest distribution company in
Finland. On 3 February 2016, the Consumer Ombudsman released a statement saying that it
considered the price hikes excessive from consumers’ point of view (KKV 3.2.2016). The
Ombudsman further stated that the price increases were unreasonable because electricity is
considered a necessity good, and with the company having a regional monopoly, consumers
cannot change their supplier. Negotiations with the company started. The outcome, reached
towards the end of 2016, is summed up in the following statement: BCaruna will reduce its
fixed basic prices for electricity transmission by 25 per cent for all customers and both of its
network companies for the next 12 months. This compensation will also balance the price
increase in 2017. Furthermore, Caruna has given a commitment that it will not implement new
price increases in 2017.^ The Competition and Consumer Authority even considered bringing
a class action suit against Caruna (KKV 18.2.2016). This procedure has never been used in
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Finland despite an Act providing for it being on the books since 2007 (Class Action Act
13.4.2007/444).
On 25 August 2017, the 2013 Electricity Market Act was amended to incorporate regula-
tion against price increases by transmission companies. In principle, a cap of 15% has been
imposed on increases in transmission and distribution prices over a one-year period.
(Amendment to the Elecricity Market Act 590/2017).
Notwithstanding, in 2018 Caruna and several other companies implemented another series
of price increases, prompting the government to initiate an official investigation into the
reasons for the price hikes (TEM 28.5.2018).
Discussion
The impacts of the 2013 Electricity Market Act were evaluated from many different angles
(Partanen et al. 2006; Partanen et al. 2012; Government Proposal HE 20/2013) before the Act
was passed and enacted, but no CBA such as that presented here was conducted. Before the
Act came into force, Partanen et al. (2006, 2012) pointed out that a previously suggested 24-h
limit for rural blackouts would be economically inefficient and a 36-h limit would be
economically more viable. Our analysis indicates that the 36-h limit for the rural network is
still too restrictive in some cases, as the benefits for the rural population are not high enough to
justify the costs brought by the increased price of electricity distribution. We must note,
however, that according to the ministry tasked with drafting the Act, the legislation had goals
apart from reducing the impacts of extreme weather. Principal among these were the need to
address the maintenance backlog and to ensure the security of supply throughout the country.
The suboptimality we have described here is to be understood in strictly economic terms.
Indeed, we acknowledge that a policy may be informed by other than economic objectives,
such as national security, as noted above.
In Europe, we have seen a significant increase in damages to forests that have partly been
caused by forest management practices that have favoured plantation of tree species (Norway
spruce) that are easily uprooted (Gregow et al. 2017). By better forest management practices,
the damages could have been less severe although not avoidable (Suvanto et al. 2016; Pukkala
et al. 2016), whereby compliance with the Act cannot be guaranteed by these measures alone.
However, the duration of blackouts in rural areas could be reduced with appropriate forest
management, and the costs of doing so would be substantially smaller than the costs of laying
underground cables. The economic efficiency of such measures – or less strict requirements for
rural areas - should have been compared to underground cabling. The present analysis has
evaluated only the 24- and the 36-h limits from an economic perspective. An additional
consideration is that if the renewal of the network had a less strict deadline, overhead power
lines could be used until the end of their technical lifecycle, and then be replaced by the
underground cables. This would substantially decrease the total costs resulting from the
requirements of the Act.
One limitation of our analysis is that the benefits may rise if WTP for avoiding of blackouts
increases in the future, for instance due to an increasing dependence of households on
electricity. Increasing income levels could also have an effect. In 2015, disposable income
had not increased in the past decade (Statistics Finland 2014b); however, since 2015 there has
been a slight increase in mean, but not median, disposable income. Moreover, as the income
elasticity of WTP is not reported in the original studies, scaling up the WTP figures would be
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questionable. In addition, many electronic appliances now come with a battery. As battery
technology improves, WTP values may well decrease. On balance, we feel that the current
WTP range is wide enough to cover the uncertainty in consumers’ WTP and thus have not
considered any increase or decrease in the WTP.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, CBA should account for distortionary effects, primarily those
related to labour supply resulting from changes in household preferences between labour and
leisure. A distortionary effect means that due to income taxation the labour supply is not at its
optimal level in the equilibrium (Johansson-Stenman 2005). If a proposed project increases the
labour supply, its distortionary effects are positive, and if it decreases the supply, the effects are
negative. There is little empirical evidence on the effect of changing energy prices on the
labour supply; only the effects of demand have been studied rigorously (e.g. Asafu-Adjaye
2000; Papapetrou 2001). In our analysis, potential labour supply effects are more important, as
the costs are mainly borne by household users; it is difficult to say anything certain about these
or even about the direction of a possible change.
Distributional effects can be studied by comparing the benefits received by different
income groups and assigning different social welfare weights to different groups, so that
lower income groups are assigned a higher weight (e.g. Adler 2013), or by reporting the
distributional issues qualitatively in the analysis (Nyborg 2014). In this analysis, it is
possible to divide the individuals into urban and rural populations, as the benefits are
distributed unevenly among the two groups. However, we cannot use individual benefit-
income pairs as a basis for calculating distributional weights, and thus only report
distributional effects qualitatively.
An analysis by the Bank of Finland (Mäki-Fränti 2016) has indicated that the income
differences between regions in Finland are small. The five least urbanised regions have an
average income 77% of those with the highest urbanisation rate (Mäki-Fränti 2016). In the
analysis, we have used average VoLL figures for households for all different regions. Averages
could be adjusted regionally to take into account the effect of income on VoLL. None of the
primary literature studies report the income elasticity of VoLL, but Carlsson et al. (2011) report
a positive income effect for the reported VoLL values. This would mean an even lower NPV
for the rural case, but an improved NPV for the urban case. The differences in the production
per capita in the rural and urban regions are much higher, but taxes and transfers decrease the
income gap between urban and rural population. However, if distributional concerns are taken
into account, both the benefits and the costs of the rural population should be assigned slightly
higher weights than those of the urban population, making the rural case more negative.
Of greatest concern are those rural areas that have their own distribution company. In such
cases, the rural population needs to pay a higher price for the increase in the electricity price as
compared to its WTP. Even if less urbanised regions are not that poor on average, the poorest
municipalities are located in the rural areas. Moreover, the share of low-income households is
much higher in rural areas than in urban areas, around 4% compared to around 2%. (Statistics
Finland 2018). Electricity companies operating solely in rural areas may find it difficult to fully
recoup their investment. They companies may consider not investing in underground cabling,
but rather in improving their forest management practices around power lines. However, there
is no guarantee that such measures will increase the reliability of the network to the standard
required by the Act. The independence of such companies may be jeopardised, possibly
resulting in mergers.
The literature (Onuma et al. 2016; Onuma et al. 2017a, 2017b) shows that CCA and DRR
are often dynamic processes, as both individuals and societies learn from past disasters and
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increase their preparedness. In our case, the high impact storms in 2006, 2010 and 2011 clearly
had an impact on public policy, and these experiences were part of the knowledge base
informing the regulation. Our analysis shows that this dynamic process can also lead to an
overreaction from the point of view of economic optimality.
Conclusions and Implications
Over-adaptation to the impacts of extreme weather and climate change has rarely been
discussed in the literature. The literature is rich in examples where CCA and DRR measures
are reported to be economically efficient, whereas counter-examples are few. We claim that
this is due partly to reporting practices, and partly to imprecise definitions of efficient
adaptation.
As a case study, we undertook a CBA of the 2013 Finnish Electricity Market Act,
which imposes strict requirements on electricity distribution companies to prevent black-
outs in their grid. Our results indicate that in urban areas the public policy and the
required investment are economically efficient. However, in rural areas, the costs of the
required investments exceed their economic benefits, indicating that the optimal require-
ments would have been somewhere between the old practices and the new. Depending on
the operating area of a given electricity distribution company, the present requirements
will result either in urban customers paying for the improved well-being of rural
customers or rural customers having to bear the high cost of improving network
reliability on their own. This cost is expected to be higher than the NPV for the
improvement. Our results indicate that the present policy may be an overreaction to an
existing problem: it seems that at some Bquantity^ (urban requirements), NPV is strictly
positive, whereas at another level of service provision (rural requirements), NPV is
negative.
Our case study indicates that over-adaptation is a relevant concept meriting consideration
the CCA and DRR literature. Our case also shows that when assessing the success of public
regulation and measures aiming at reducing the risk of extreme weather events and climate
change, public opinion and potential and perceived negative effects on the public should be
considered. The population affected by the impacts may not accept the implementation of
otherwise effective DRR and CCAmeasures. This applies particularly when there is a potential
mismatch between societal and individual preferences. Furthermore, the WTP of the people
affected should be carefully evaluated prior to any policy change, as the WTP obtained in
surveys may prove to be different from the WTP of the affected population. All in all, from the
point of view of good governance, the significance of identifying over-adaptation is that it adds
to our understanding of strong popular inclinations to avoid risks relating to the availability of
an essential good, such as energy. Popular concerns may affect decision-making such that the
resulting actions clash with the equally important objective of providing that good being at an
affordable price.
Reducing the impacts of extreme weather events and adapting to climate change are
challenging tasks given the many climatic, societal and political uncertainties. Despite these
uncertainties, designing and implementing policy instruments and concrete measures is highly
important due to the intensifying threat of climate change. Economic efficiency of the
envisaged measures is one key criterion to be used in designing the instruments; however,
the challenge for policy makers is to design instruments that are accepted by the public.
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System flexibility is essential in ensuring that the net benefits of a given project do not fall in
the range of over-adaptation. This study has shown that CBAs evaluating potential CCA and
DRR measures should better address suboptimalities.
Milestones and events Time and reference Notes
A government report by an investigator”
Improving the reliability of electricity
network”
2002 / KTM 18/2002 Early report including a discussion on
the urban requirement of a maximum
6-h blackout.
A government report” The compensation
costs for blackouts”
2002 / KTM 11/2002 Early report including discussion on the
compensation that customers are
entitled in case of blackouts.
A working group named ““Preventing
disruptions in the electricity network
and improvement of the operational
goals” report: “Improving the reliability
of the supply of electricity”
KTM 19.12.2006 The report included discussion on the
blackouts statistics; historical
development of blackouts; international
comparison; discussion on the
maximum allowed blackout periods;
discussion and very crude estimates
on the costs and benefits of increasing
the underground cabling rates of low-
and medium-voltage networks
A report by Technical University of
Lappeenranta “
Partanen et al. (2006) The report included a discussion as well
as calculations of the benefits and costs
of different maximum allowable
blackout durations (6-10 h total
blackout duration in one year under
normal conditions, 24-48 h during
major disturbances); It was concluded
that the maximum of 6–10 h cumulative
duration per customer is reasonable in
normal conditions, but setting a strict
time limit in case of major disturbances
– such as storms – cannot be justified
from an economic perspective; The
report also mentions that for some
(rural) electricity companies, there
could be less strict deadlines.
A legislative proposal by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Employment
of Finland (TEM) “Measures to
improve the reliability of electricity
supply and decrease the impacts of
blackouts”
TEM 16.3.2012 Included the final (acceptability)
requirements of at maximum 6-h
blackouts in urban areas, and either
a 24- or a 36-h maximum duration
in rural areas
An impact analysis report of the legislative
proposal of TEM, by Technical
University of Lappeenranta “An impact
analysis of the measures to improve
the reliability of electricity supply and
decrease the impacts of blackouts”
Partanen et al. (2012) In this report is was concluded that the
24-h deadline for the maximum
blackout periods in rural areas is too
strict, and the 36 h deadline is more
favourable from an economic point
of view. Longer maximum blackout
periods were not considered, as the
proposal did not include them.
Government proposal HE 20/2013 A proposal for the new Electricity
Market Act.
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